A report released June 9 by the
FBI's Office of the Inspector General raises new questions
about the role of the US government in the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. The internal FBI study
provides several important revelations about how US
intelligence agencies ignored and even suppressed warnings
in the period leading up to the attacks on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon that killed nearly 3,000
people.
Press accounts published within hours of the report's
release gave a very distorted picture of the document,
which runs to more than 400 pages. No follow-up reports,
based on a thorough study of the text, have yet appeared
in the mass media.
The initial media commentary invariably voiced the
now-standard claim that the FBI and CIA were guilty
of a "failure to connect the dots," due to
bureaucratic lethargy, individual incompetence, inter-agency
rivalries, even poorly performing software systems.
This presentation of events is utterly unserious.
The US intelligence apparatus
is the most powerful instrument for spying in the world,
not a group of Keystone Cops. If it ignored warnings
and suppressed information, a legitimate presumption
is that it did so willfully. The question must
be posed: did one or more agencies or high-level officials
provide protection for known Al Qaeda associates who
ultimately participated in the hijack-bombings?
Exactly who knew what, and at what level of the government,
is not yet clear. But the political benefits of 9/11
for the Bush administration are undeniable. It used
the terrorist attacks as a lever to swing American public
opinion behind a major shift in policy, both foreign
and domestic. Without 9/11, it
would have been politically impossible for the government
to embark on military interventions in Central Asia
and the Middle East and launch an unprecedented attack
on civil liberties at home.
The Phoenix memo
The FBI internal report examines the three best-known
episodes in which the bureau, which is the lead agency
for counterterrorist activities within the United States,
missed or ignored important signals of the coming terrorist
attacks. Two of the cases involved local FBI agents
who voiced suspicions that were disregarded or suppressed
by FBI headquarters. In the third case, the CIA deliberately
kept the FBI in the dark—with the assistance of
certain FBI officials.
The first instance is the electronic
memo of July 10, 2001 from Kenneth Williams,
an FBI agent in Phoenix, Arizona, noting
the number of students with ties to radical Islamic
fundamentalists enrolled at local aviation training
schools, and suggesting that a nationwide canvass
of these schools be carried out to determine if there
was a pattern.
The second is the bureau's response to the arrest
of Zaccarias Moussaoui, an Islamic fundamentalist who
was detained by the Immigration and Naturalization Service
after his attempts to obtain training on a Boeing 747
aroused suspicions at a Minneapolis-area flight school.
Moussaoui was detained on immigration
charges in early August 2001, but FBI headquarters blocked
efforts by Minneapolis agents to pursue an investigation
that could have identified other Al Qaeda operatives
at US flight schools.
The third is the case of Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf
al-Hazmi, believed to have participated
in the hijacking of American Airlines Flight 77,
which hit the Pentagon on 9/11. Despite being on a CIA
watch list because of connections to Al Qaeda, the two
lived openly in San Diego, California for a year or
more. The CIA only notified the FBI of their presence
in the US on August 27, 2001, 20 months after their
arrival, and only two weeks before September 11.
The chapter in the inspector general's report on the
Phoenix memo (called an Electronic Communication or
EC, in FBI jargon), reveals that the document was sent
to the attention of six people at FBI headquarters and
two more at the New York Division. The recipients included
personnel and leadership of both the Usama Bin Laden
Unit and the Radical Fundamentalists Unit, the latter
comprising a separate group of agents assigned to investigate
Islamist militants not directly affiliated to Al Qaeda.
None of the agents who received the EC took any serious
action. Several did not even read it. The report attributes
the inaction and inattention to the lack of resources
committed to anti-terrorist activities in the summer
of 2001. For instance, there was only a single research
analyst assigned to the FBI's Bin Laden Unit in 2001,
and she was transferred to another unit in July 2001.
One agent at a field office who was sent the Phoenix
EC replied that it was "no big secret" that
Arab men were receiving aviation training in the United
States. (Williams's concern, however, was not over "Arab
men," but rather individuals affiliated with radical
Islamic fundamentalists who publicly justified terrorist
attacks on US targets.) The FBI's New York Field Office,
which had the lead role in counterterrorism, flatly
rejected Williams's proposal for a more in-depth study
of the flight school issue.
In passing, the inspector general's report notes that
there was already considerable information "contained
in FBI files about airplanes and flight schools at the
time the Phoenix EC was received at FBI HQ." It
mentions four examples, implying that many more could
be cited.
One of these examples is the following:
"In August 1998, an intelligence agency advised
the FBI's New York Division of an alleged plan by unidentified
Arabs to fly an explosive laden aircraft from Libya
into the World Trade Center."
This previously unreported warning
directly contradicts the claims, made repeatedly by
Bush administration officials, especially Condoleezza
Rice, that "no one could have imagined" hijacked
airplanes being used as flying bombs against US targets.
The Moussaoui case
The entire chapter on Moussaoui, 115 pages long, is
redacted from the version published last week, at the
order of the federal judge who has been presiding over
Moussaoui's terrorism trial. Only a few references to
Moussaoui survive in other parts of the report.
A fuller analysis of this episode awaits the release
of the redacted chapter, after Moussaoui's sentencing.
But the gist of the situation is that local Minneapolis
FBI agents asked for permission to conduct further inquiries,
including searching Moussaoui's computer, while supervisors
at FBI headquarters cited the necessity for a warrant
from a special court established under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA). The supervisors refused to
apply for the FISA warrant, saying the case did not
meet the court's criteria.
In one passage, the inspector general's report cites
a top FBI lawyer's statement that "he had never
seen a supervisory special agent in Headquarters so
adamant that a FISA warrant could not be obtained and
at the same time a field office so adamant that it could."
The report also notes that the Minneapolis field office
sought an "expedited FISA," which "normally
involved reports of a suspected imminent attack or other
imminent danger."
While FBI supervisors were blocking action on Moussaoui,
a CIA liaison officer in Minneapolis was reporting his
arrest to the CIA. George Tenet, the CIA director, was
briefed on the matter.
By the end of August, French intelligence officials
had provided the US government with information on Moussaoui's
connections to Islamic fundamentalist groups, but the
FBI still took no action. Moussaoui, who was being held
on immigration violations, was not even transferred
from the Immigration and Naturalization Service to FBI
custody until after September 11.
The San Diego hijackers
By far the most damning material in the FBI inspector
general's report relates to Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf
al-Hazmi, two of the 9/11 hijackers who lived in the
San Diego area for much of 2000 and 2001. The report
details at least five instances during this period when
the FBI could have or should have become aware of their
presence and purpose.
The two men entered the United States on January 15,
2000, flying from Bangkok, Thailand to Los Angeles International
Airport. Mihdhar was a participant
at a January 5, 2000 meeting of Al Qaeda operatives
in Malaysia, where he and
others were photographed by an unnamed intelligence
service. These photos
were supplied to the CIA.
The US National Security Agency had separately identified
Hazmi as an associate of Mihdhar. The two men were tracked
by the CIA traveling from Malaysia to Thailand.
CIA cables contemporaneously discussed Mihdhar's travel
and the fact that he had a US visa in his Saudi passport.
So intensive was the surveillance that agents obtained
a photocopy of the passport and visa stamp and delivered
it to CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia. Two months
later, the Bangkok CIA station identified Hazmi as Mihdhar's
traveling companion and reported that he had traveled
on from Bangkok to Los Angeles on January 15, 2000.
The most critical information
about Mihdhar and Hazmi was withheld from the FBI for
more than a year and a half. The FBI was informed
about the Malaysia meeting as soon as it happened, and
even about Mihdhar's presence at it. But there was no
mention of his passport with a multiple-entry US visa,
giving him easy access to American territory, where
the FBI had the principal responsibility for counterterrorism.
Nor did the CIA tell the FBI that Hazmi had actually
entered the country, which would certainly have triggered
an alert. The CIA itself did not put either man on any
other security watch list.
Two weeks after their arrival in Los Angeles, Mihdhar
and Hazmi moved to San Diego, apparently at the urging
of a new acquaintance, Omar Bayoumi, a man once under
FBI surveillance and believed to be an operative or
asset of the Saudi intelligence service. He invited
the two newly arrived Saudis to San Diego, where they
rented an apartment in the complex where he lived. Bayoumi
co-signed the lease and even wrote a check for the rent
because the two had only cash.
In May 2000, the two men rented a room from another
San Diego man who was an FBI informant, and who reported
their arrival and their first names to his handler.
The handler did not ask the last names or show any other
interest.
The informant is not named in the inspector general's
report, but he has been identified in previous press
accounts as Abdussattar Shaikh, another Saudi immigrant.
(Both Shaikh and his FBI handler, now retired, refused
to speak with the FBI inspector general probing the
bureau's response to 9/11, a remarkable circumstance
that is recorded in the report only in a footnote, and
without explanation.)
The actions of Hazmi and Mihdhar
strongly suggest that they were being protected and
were themselves aware of it. They conducted themselves,
not as underground conspirators, trying to keep one
step ahead of the most powerful spy apparatus in the
world, but as men seemingly indifferent to threats to
their security.
According to the FBI report: "... they did not
attempt to hide their identities. Using the same names
contained in their travel documents and known to at
least some in the Intelligence Community, they rented
an apartment, obtained driver's licenses from the state
of California Department of Motor Vehicles, opened bank
accounts and received bank credit cards, purchased a
used vehicle and automotive insurance, took flying lessons
at a local flying school, and obtained local phone service
that included Hazmi's listing in the local telephone
directory."
Even though this is not the first time the actions
of Hazmi and Mihdhar have been detailed, one rubs one's
eyes in astonishment at this passage. Hazmi could only
have made himself more obvious if he had taken out an
ad in the Yellow Pages under "T" for terrorist.
But the CIA, which knew who he was, chose not to expose
him to the FBI.
In June 2000, Mihdhar left the US, not returning until
July 4, 2001, when he flew into John F. Kennedy International
Airport in New York City. Hazmi lived in San Diego for
several more months, then moved to Phoenix and eventually
the East Coast.
Following the bombing of the
USS Cole in December 2000, interest in Mihdhar and Hazmi
revived. A US intelligence source identified
one of the participants in the January 2000 Malaysia
meeting as the ringleader of the Cole attack, and the
FBI, which had lead responsibility for the investigation,
began to review all those who attended that meeting.
However, in discussions in January 2001 and again
in May and June 2001, CIA officials did not tell the
FBI that Mihdhar, now known to be associated with the
suspected organizer of the Cole bombing, had a US visa,
or that Hazmi, Mihdhar's associate, had entered the
United States.
Much of this material in the
report is difficult to follow, partly because of bureaucratic
complexities, partly because of the large amount of
redaction, apparently to conceal the nationality of
the intelligence agency that had monitored the Malaysia
meeting (most likely the Israeli Mossad). The
inspector general's report cites cooperation by Malaysian,
Thai and Yemeni security services without redaction.
The CIA finally told the FBI what it knew about Mihdhar
and Hazmi on August 27, 2001, five days after the FBI
had discovered independently, on August 22, that Mihdhar
might be in the US, and the agency had opened its own
investigation. The New York FBI office was notified,
but the job of tracking down Mihdhar was assigned to
a novice agent as his first intelligence case, an indication
of the low priority given to the investigation. Only
perfunctory steps to locate Mihdhar and Hazmi had been
taken by September 11, when the two men boarded the
American Airlines jet.
Indications of a CIA cover-up
The FBI inspector general's
report reveals for the first time that the CIA not only
failed to inform the FBI about Mihdhar, but that CIA
officials intervened to suppress a memorandum drafted
by an FBI agent detailed to the CIA-run Counter-Terrorism
Center (CTC), who wanted to notify the FBI about the
suspected terrorist with a US visa.
The blow-by-blow account of this incident in the FBI
report strongly implies a CIA cover-up.
The FBI agent, dubbed "Dwight" in the inspector
general's report, drafted the memorandum, a Central
Intelligence Report (CIR), on January 5, 2000, only
hours after the Malaysia meeting had taken place. The
same day, a CIA desk officer, dubbed "Michelle,"
relayed instructions from her supervisor barring distribution
of the CIR to the FBI.
Three hours later, "Michelle" drafted and
circulated an internal CIA cable which summarized the
information on Mihdhar, including his multiple-entry
US visa. This cable declared that his travel documents
had been copied and passed "to the FBI for further
investigation." This was a lie, which was later
used by the CIA to substantiate its initial claim that
it had notified the FBI about Mihdhar.
This cable could not possibly be an innocent mistake,
since it was sent out after its author had relayed the
instructions to "Dwight" that his memo to
the FBI not be sent. Under questioning from the inspector
general, no one at the CIA or the FBI could corroborate
the claim in the cable by "Michelle" that
the CIA had notified the FBI about Mihdhar—a claim
that was diametrically opposed to what the CIA was doing
in practice.
The report notes that the CIA initially withheld information
about the existence of the January 2000 memorandum by
"Dwight" from the inspector general's office.
Quoting from the report:
"In February 2004, however, while we were reviewing
a list of CIA documents that had been accessed by
FBI employees assigned to the CIA, we noticed the
title of a document that appeared to be relevant to
this review and had not been previously disclosed
to us. The CIA OIG [Office of the Inspector General]
had not previously obtained this document in connection
with its review. We obtained this document, known
as a Central Intelligence Report (CIR). This CIR was
a draft document addressed to the FBI containing information
about Mihdhar's travel and possession of a US visa.
As a result of the discovery of this new document,
a critical document that we later determined had not
been sent to the FBI before the September 11 attacks
(see Section III, A, 4 below), we had to re-interview
several FBI and CIA employees and obtain additional
documents from the CIA. The belated discovery of this
CIA document delayed the completion of our review."
The aggrieved tone is unmistakable.
First the CIA withheld the document from the FBI, then
the CIA attempted to conceal the existence of the document
from the FBI's postmortem probe.
The cover-up was followed by a curious epidemic of
amnesia. No one who worked on, received or read the
draft CIR from "Dwight," including "Dwight"
himself, could remember anything about it. Again the
report:
"When we interviewed all of the individuals
involved with the CIR, they asserted that they recalled
nothing about it. Dwight told the OIG that he did
not recall being aware of the information about Mihdhar,
did not recall drafting the CIR, did not recall whether
he drafted the CIR on his own initiative or at the
direction of his supervisor, and did not recall any
discussions about the reason for delaying completion
and dissemination of the CIR. Malcolm said he did
not recall reviewing any of the cable traffic or any
information regarding Hazmi and Mihdhar. Eric told
the OIG that he did not recall the CIR.
"The CIA employees also stated that they did
not recall the CIR. Although James, the CIA employee
detailed to FBI Headquarters, declined to be interviewed
by us, he told the CIA OIG that he did not recall
the CIR. John (the deputy chief of the Bin Laden Unit)
and Michelle, the desk officer who was following this
issue, also stated that they did not recall the CIR,
any discussions putting it on hold, or why it was
not sent."
Again, the tone of incredulity is clear. None of these
people remember anything, and one of them actually refuses
to be interviewed! And this is not about a minor matter,
but concerns the first report on a man who was one of
the 19 hijackers on 9/11.
A politically motivated whitewash
The FBI inspector general's
report is, like all previous official investigations
into the events of 9/11, a cover-up for the state apparatus.
These investigations share one
common feature: they completely exclude, a priori, any
question of government complicity in terrorist attacks.
Instead, we have the familiar litany of breast-beating
over mistakes, complacency, inattention and inadequate
resources.
Despite the all-purpose explanation that "mistakes
were made," names are never named in any of these
probes. No one is ever held accountable. No one is shamed
or punished.
There is a definite reason for this: the US government
does not want to generate a Watergate syndrome, in which
punishment meted out at a lower level leads to people
implicating higher-ups and focuses attention on the
role of top officials.
There can hardly remain any serious doubt that a section
of the American intelligence apparatus functioned as
the guardian angels for at least some of the suicide
hijackers. The question is: why?
Until there is an investigation of 9/11 by a genuinely
independent body—one wholly free of the US military/intelligence
apparatus—it is impossible to specify precisely
the role of the government in these events.
But on the basis of a political analysis alone, it
is clear that 9/11 did not come as a bolt from the blue.
As in the investigation of any crime, a critical question
to be posed is: who benefits? For
powerful sections of the US ruling elite and its state
apparatus, a major terrorist attack on US soil was anticipated,
desired and, most probably, facilitated in order to
provide the necessary climate of fear and patriotic
fervor to implement a sweeping program of political
reaction, both at home and abroad.
Without 9/11, there would be no US occupation of Iraq,
putting an American army squarely at the center of the
world's largest pool of oil. Without 9/11, there would
be no US bases across Central Asia, guarding the second
largest source of oil and gas. And without 9/11, the
Bush administration would have been unable to sustain
itself politically, faced with a deteriorating economy
and widespread opposition to its tax cuts for millionaires
and social measures to appease the fundamentalist Christian
Right.
The Democratic Party is deeply
implicated, supporting both the war in Iraq and the
cover-up of the role of the state in the 9/11 attacks.
The Clinton administration sought to provoke a confrontation
with Iraq in 1998, but had to back off in the face of
public opposition to a new war in the Middle East—opposition
that was only overcome in the wake of September 11.
Moreover, the connection
between US intelligence agencies and reactionary Islamic
fundamentalists like bin Laden goes back nearly two
decades, involving Democratic and Republican administrations
alike.
Despite its tactical differences with the White House
and squabbles over positions of influence, the Democratic
Party accepts the basic program of the Bush administration.
Should the Democrats return to power, they would not
withdraw US forces from Iraq or Central Asia, nor rescind
Bush's tax cuts for the wealthy, nor repeal the USA
Patriot Act or attacks on democratic rights. |